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1Abstract: This paper uses plant level data on the world￿ s copper min-
ing industry to measure changes in e¢ ciency from the adoption of the ISO 14001
environmental standard. The ISO 14001 is a voluntary standard that sets out
minimum guidelines and procedures that ￿rms should follow in order to achieve
more e⁄ective management of the environment. Anecdotal and case study lit-
erature suggests that ￿rms are motivated to adopt the ISO 14001 standard and
seek certi￿cation for a number of reasons. One important reason is the desire to
achieve greater e¢ ciency and cost savings through changes in operating proce-
dures and processes aimed at the minimization of waste pollution and reduction
in the use of resource inputs. Using plant level data from 1992-2007 on virtually
all of the world￿ s industrial copper mines the study tests this hypothesis in a
stochastic frontier and random e⁄ects model framework. The study measures
the impact on operations of ISO 14001 adoption both in respect to the inten-
tion to seek ISO 14001 certi￿cation (the period before certi￿cation when ￿rms
must make necessary changes to their operations and management) and the pe-
riod when and after certi￿cation is achieved. The study ￿nds no evidence that
adoption of the ISO 14001 standard imposes a cost on ￿rms ￿ either through
lower e¢ ciencies or higher costs. In fact, in many cases adoption is associated
with higher e¢ ciency, and to a certain extent, lower costs. Thus, the study￿ s
￿ndings would tend to go against the claims of much of the academic literature
that regulation has negative impacts on the ￿rm. Although ￿ndings were not
robust to model choice or a subset sample, our results clearly indicate that, at a
minimum, the adoption of the ISO 14001 does not raise costs or lower e¢ ciency
for ￿rms.
Key Words: ISO 14001; stochastic frontier production function; e¢ -
ciency; cost savings; mining.
21 Introduction
ISO 14000 is a series of voluntary standards for environmental management. The
series provides a set of "best practice" tools and techniques that if adopted will
ostensibly help ￿rms minimize their environmental footprint and conserve re-
sources. Currently ￿rms can gain certi￿cation in only one standard, ISO 14001.
This particular standard is the core of the 14000 series. It outlines the speci￿c
criteria ￿rms should follow for implementing an environmental management sys-
tem (EMS). The number of ￿rms that have certi￿ed their operations under the
14001 EMS has increased rapidly since 1996. Adoption and certi￿cation have
been particularly high among major multinational corporations. A survey pub-
lished by the ISO in 2005 reported the number of ISO 14001 certi￿cations stood
at 561,943 worldwide in 138 countries/economies [23].
Case study and anecdotal evidence suggests that few ￿rms adopt the ISO
14001 standard do so out of a concern for the environment or to improve their
own environmental performance. Firms are more likely to give other reasons
for the adoption of the standard such as: improved market share through the
promotion of a green image, relief from mandatory regulation, reduced legal
liabilities, and achievement of e¢ ciency and cost savings. The latter are two oft-
cited, non-environmental reasons for seeking ISO 14001 certi￿cation. They are
especially important given the general belief among economists that regulation,
even voluntary, imposes costs on ￿rms and diverts resources away from other
areas of an operation. Hence it is important to determine if there are any savings
and e¢ ciency outcomes for ￿rms that adopt the standard.
Using plant level data from 1992-2007 on virtually all of the world￿ s industrial
copper mines the study tests the hypothesis that the adoption of the 14001
standard is associated with greater e¢ ciency and cost savings. The copper
industry is a truly global industry, one which is both highly competitive and
highly polluting. The study measures both the intention to seek ISO 14001
certi￿cation ￿the period before certi￿cation when ￿rms make necessary changes
to their facility￿ s operation and management ￿and the period when and after
certi￿cation is achieved. It examines these impacts on mine performance using
a stochastic frontier and random e⁄ects model framework.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II motivates
the paper in the context of a brief discussion of the ISO 14001 standard. It
also reviews the academic literature on motivations for and outcomes of the
adoption of the 14001 standard, with a focus on ￿rm performance. Section III
discusses the model and its estimation using a stochastic frontier cost function
approach. Section IV presents and discusses the data set used in the analysis. It
also discusses aspects of the copper mining industry relevant for the e¢ ciency
analysis. Section V summarizes the paper￿ s results. Section VI provides a
summary and conclusion, focusing on the implications of the study￿ s ￿ndings
for understanding ￿rm motivations for adopting the ISO 14001 standard.
32 Literature Review
2.1 Nature & Characteristics of the ISO 14001 Standard
The ISO 14000 series is a voluntary set of standards inaugurated in 1996 by the
International Association of Standards. A collaborative e⁄ort between industry
representatives, national standards associations, governmental and environmen-
tal bodies worldwide, the impetus for 14000 guidelines arose from the Uruguay
Round of Trade GATT negotiations and the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 [28].
Although many other national and regional environmental standards (e.g. BSO
7750, EU and American eco-labelling programs) exist, the 14000 series is the
only international set of guidelines. The ISO 14000 series provides a common
set of standards for environmental management covering 5 areas: management
systems, auditing, performance evaluation, labelling, life-cycle assessments, and
products standards.
The 14001 component within this series relates to a ￿rm￿ s environmental
management system (EMS). The EMS is a systematic and coherent framework
specifying the policies, targets, assigned responsibilities, and procedures a ￿rm
should follow in order to minimize its environmental footprint and conserve re-
sources. Adoption of the standard involves 5 steps: a) the development of an
environmental policy that has the commitment of senior executives; b) a plan
for identi￿cation of environmental areas, legal and regulatory commitments and
targets for improvement of environmental performance; c) a system for imple-
mentation of targets (including programs for training all employees in environ-
mental awareness and competency), the delineation of clear responsibilities and
channels of communication and documentation of the EMS, and procedures for
control of environmental impacts of all operations in the ￿rm; d) a system for
continual monitoring, measurement and improvement of environmental perfor-
mance (including an audit system for reporting problems and non-compliance);
and e) constant re-evaluation by senior management of the e⁄ectiveness of all
internal programs, systems, products, and targets [6, 39].
It is important to note that the 14001 standard is a process rather than a
products or technical standard. As such, it leaves it up to the ￿rm to decide
how it will design and implement its EMS to achieve its stated environmental
goals. Thus, while for each ￿rm the requirements for the EMS will be the same,
environmental targets and the technical and other means for achieving them
will di⁄er greatly. This ￿ exibility means that the standard can be applied in a
variety of organizations and its components implemented in a variety of ways.
Irrespective of what the ￿rm chooses to do, it must comply with any environ-
mental legislation and regulations required by a country or trade agreement. In
addition, ￿rms must commit to continually improve their environmental per-
formance [23]. Once the 14001 EMS is in place the facility will usually seek
certi￿cation from an accredited external organization. While some ￿rms choose
to simply adopt their internal processes according to the 14001 standard, most
will seek formal certi￿cation [39].
Proponents of the standard argue that apart from its bene￿cial environmen-
tal impacts, adoption of the ISO 14001 standard also has far-reaching bene￿ts for
￿rm competitiveness. First, e¢ ciency and cost savings can be achieved through
the introduction of an EMS that cuts waste, lowers pollution, uses fewer re-
sources, raises employee awareness of the environmental impacts of operations,
4and lowers the costs associated with environmental accidents and poor perfor-
mance. Second, by forcing ￿rms to think about the impacts of their operations
on the environment every step of the way, adoption can bring useful environmen-
tal expertise and employee accountability to the ￿rm [36, 37,21]. This proactive
attitude can in turn help to generate new skills and innovative technologies,
with potentially positive outcomes for a ￿rm￿ s competitiveness [19, 6].
Third, because it enforces a standard of performance over and above current
mandatory regulations, proponents argue that the standard may also serve to
cut costs in other ways. For example, it may help to inoculate ￿rms against
the costs of current and future liabilities arising from public expectations of
corporate responsibility and environmental quality. By providing consistent
information to shareholders and managers about the possible environmental
performance of its operations, the standard can also help reduce legal liabilities
through reduced accidents and environmental incidents. Insurance may also be
reduced since the standard signals that ￿rms are adopting "due diligence" [4, 26,
1]. Finally, voluntary adherence can also increase a ￿rm￿ s status and legitimacy
in the eyes of the green consumer, potentially raising pro￿ts, share value and
investor con￿dence [2, 28, 11, 18, 27, 3].
This view contrasts sharply with conventional thinking on the impacts of
environmental regulations on ￿rm performance. This literature argues that en-
vironmental regulation imposes burdensome ￿nancial costs on ￿rms that reduce
their overall competitiveness (e.g. see [10, 12, 24, 35]). According to critics, even
voluntary regulations divert resources away from areas where true e¢ ciency and
cost-savings might be achieved, discouraging ￿rms from seeking real solutions
to problems of waste and pollution [24, 10, 35]. Most importantly, voluntary
regulations can lead to regulatory desertion, leaving environmental quality up
to the perpetrators of pollution and waste rather than public o¢ cials. This
may especially be the case with small to medium sized businesses. Discouraged
by the high costs of achieving ISO 14001 certi￿cation, and having met the legal
standard, smaller ￿rms may decide to forgo any further investments in pollution
abatement, energy use or waste control [8].
The ISO 14001 standard, in particular, may impose substantial costs on ￿rms
in respect to process and product changes, employee time and training, auditing,
reporting, marketing, and legal expertise.1 Since ￿rms could implement any
changes without adoption of the costs of the standard, critics charge that they
simply do so out of the desire to advertise a green image, which could be achieved
more cost-e⁄ectively with an e⁄ective marketing campaign [41].
In view of the con￿ icting evidence of the merits of adopting the ISO 14001
standard, and the costs it can impose on ￿rms, it is worthwhile to ask: Does
its implementation really provide any bene￿cial outcomes for a ￿rm? There
is a paucity of research on this issue, which this study aims to address. Most
evidence on the impacts of ISO 14001 certi￿cation on ￿rm performance comes
from case studies and anecdotal evidence compiled from interviews with senior
management.
Overall, this qualitative literature suggests that ￿rms are motivated to adopt
the standard for a variety of reasons: greater e¢ ciency and cost savings, im-
proved environmental performance, enhanced employee participation in envi-
1For example, Szymanki and Tiwari [41] report that US companies can spend up to
US$100,000 a year on obtaining and maintaining certi￿cation.
5ronmental management, de￿ ection of attention from regulators, better commu-
nity relations, customer pressures for environmentally friendly products, im-
proved control over personnel and work methods, harmonization of production
processes across plants, and entry into certain markets [9, 13, 17, 32, 39, 40, 18].
Interestingly, qualitative evidence from managers from a variety of industries
suggests that environmental concerns are not the main reason for adoption of
the standard. Moreover, many reasons re￿ ect managers￿perceived beliefs about
what the standard will achieve (or has achieved) rather than objectively demon-
strating actual outcomes. Even retrospective surveys do not indicate whether
outcomes are based on subjective perceptions and beliefs or have actually indeed
been achieved in practice.
For example, managers at ABB Automation￿ s Ohio plant claim that ISO
14001 certi￿cation has led to reduced costs of energy use and waste disposal
and the adoption of environmentally positive processes earlier than planned.
Managers also claim an increase in employee morale as a result of their partici-
pation in environmental protection [34]. Likewise, in their study of the Honda
Transmission Manufacturing of America plant in Ohio, McManus & Sanders
[30] report Honda managers as claiming a range of bene￿cial impacts of ISO
14001 certi￿cation, none of them directly motivated by concern for the environ-
ment, including reduced costs associated with fewer environmental incidents.
Rodinelli & Vastag [39] ￿nd that managers at Alcoa￿ s Mt. Holly plant identi-
￿ed greater operational e¢ ciency as a result of IS0 14001 certi￿cation in addi-
tion to stronger environmental management practices, cost savings and greater
employee and managerial awareness of environmental impacts.
While this qualitative literature provides useful insights into the potential
bene￿ts of ISO certi￿cation, it is largely subjective ￿and with a few exceptions
where structured survey analysis techniques have been employed ￿anecdotal in
nature. Moreover, case study literature is restricted to examining anticipated
and actual reported bene￿ts within a single facility. This narrow focus may
provide an unrepresentative view of the true impacts of the ISO 14001 standard.
Little if any objective data exist on whether stated outcomes are in fact achieved
or even intended. For example, they do not report what sort of e¢ ciency gains
or savings occurred, how they were achieved, or even measured.
The small body of econometric studies on voluntary regulation overwhelm-
ingly focus on measuring the determinants of voluntary environmental agree-
ments rather than on their impacts [3, 14, 18, 15, 22]. However, a few econo-
metric studies have attempted to measure objectively the impacts of the 14001
standard on ￿rm performance. For example, Dasgupta et al. [14] use responses
to a survey of Mexican ￿rms to measure whether their self-certi￿ed EMS im-
pacts positively on environmental performance. Results suggest that those ￿rms
that instituted ISO 14001-type internal management processes did indeed ex-
hibit higher environmental performance. The latter was measured by the gap
between the regulatory standard and the plant￿ s cost-minimizing emissions in-
tensity.
Similarly, Khanna et al. [25] use a DEA approach to measure the impact
on environmental e¢ ciency of environmental self-reporting (their proxy for vol-
untary regulation) among S&P 500 industries. The authors examine both the
determinants and level of environmental e¢ ciency. Environmental e¢ ciency is
measured as an index of the opportunity costs (or loss of desirable outputs)
relative to the costs of reducing undesirable outputs. The study ￿nds that
6di⁄erences in ESR explain di⁄erences in environmental e¢ ciencies across ￿rms
but the impact varies across industries. With two exceptions, ￿rms in industries
that have high environmental e¢ ciencies have a higher degree of ESR (as well
as a higher pro￿tability). Although they do not measure regulatory impacts of
ESR on environmental e¢ ciency, Boyd & McClelland [7] also use a DEA ap-
proach to determine the loss from potential productive output due to pollution
abatement spending in US paper plants. Their study measures productive inef-
￿ciency in terms of the allocation of investment capital away from production
e¢ cient improvements to pollution abatement spending arising from environ-
mental controls. This abatement capital constraint is found to contribute to a
small decrease in productivity.
Finally, Barla [4] carries out an econometric examination of environmental
performance (measured by such indicators as the quantity of rejected process
water, levels of biological oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids
(TSS) in water) in 37 ISO certi￿ed Quebec pulp and paper plants. The author
￿nds that ISO 14001 certi￿cation has no impact on TSS or quantity of rejected
process water but does reduce BOD in plants by 9%. Interestingly, over time, it
is the non-adopting plants that experienced more signi￿cant emission reductions
than plants that adopted ISO 14001 certi￿cation. The impacts of certi￿cation
also vary across plants; some plants signi￿cantly reduced emissions but a ma-
jority of those certi￿ed maintained and even increased emissions.
To the best of this author￿ s knowledge, no study on ￿rm performance mea-
sures e¢ ciency and/or cost savings outcomes of voluntary regulation. Of the
few studies that focus on e¢ ciency, interest is in environmental outcomes rather
than e¢ ciency and/or cost savings. Only the study by Khanna et al. [25]
examines the impact of voluntary regulation on productive e¢ ciency but not
speci￿cally in respect to the 14001 standard. Moreover, very few analyze vol-
untary agreements and e¢ ciency outcomes at the plant level ￿ the level at
which ISO 14001 is applicable. Of these studies most focus on measuring per-
formance across disparate industries where the standard, being highly ￿ exible,
will be applied in many di⁄erent ways. This heterogeneity makes it impossible
to determine in any meaningful way what its impacts on performance may be.
Finally, no study examines the impacts of the adoption of voluntary regulation
in a global context, irrespective of whether the focus is on e¢ ciency or some
other performance measure (e.g. pollution levels, share price). And none does
so in respect to voluntary standards such as ISO 14001. Previous research (case
study or econometric) focuses entirely on the impacts of voluntary management
schemes in one or at most a few countries (i.e. the US or the OECD). Since the
14001 standard is truly an international standard, it is important that empirical
analysis examine relationships of interest in a global context.
This study contributes to the small but growing body of econometric litera-
ture on the impact of voluntary regulations on ￿rm performance. It will attempt
to overcome the empirical omissions of existing studies by focusing on one indus-
try only, and in a global context. It also examines the impact of the adoption of
the ISO 14001 standard on two hitherto overlooked but important reasons cited
in the case study and anecdotal literature for adopting the standard: greater
e¢ ciency and cost savings.
73 Econometric Methodology
This study uses a stochastic cost frontier to estimate copper mine e¢ ciencies.
The basic intuition behind the model can be expressed by the simple cost frontier
where costs of mine i at time t, Cit; depends on output , Qit, and M input
prices, pj;iy (for j = 1;::;M, t = 1;::;T and i = 1;::;N). The cost frontier,
which de￿nes the minimum levels of costs achievable to produce Qi for a mine
facing input prices Xi, can be written as:
Cit = f(p1;it;::;pM;it;Qit) (1)
In practice, mines may not achieve this minimum so we can write
Cit = f(p1;it;::;pM;it;Qit)￿it; (2)
where ￿it ￿ 1 measures e¢ ciency. ￿it = 1 indicates that the mine is fully
e¢ cient (at the frontier) while higher values indicate lower levels of e¢ ciency
(i.e. ￿it is the degree to which costs are above the minimum possible). We turn
this into an econometric model by assuming particular forms for ￿it, adding
measurement error, assuming a log-linear cost function and extending the basic
ideas above to allow for or panel data set.
The econometric methods are all based on cost functions and, throughout,
we use the ￿ exible translog functional form for the cost function. A conventional
translog cost function takes the form:











However, due to data limitations and in an attempt to control for mine het-
erogeneity, we modify this conventional form in the following ways. First, we
add as additional explanatory variables geological and physical factors of the
mine that impact on costs. We call these variables Z1;::;Zk. Second, given a
lack of data on the price of capital, we include investment as one of these extra
explanatory variables. This is commonly done in the literature and gives our
cost function the interpretation of a short run cost function (as well as help-
ing correct for mine heterogeneity). With these assumptions, our translog cost
function is given as:2














Finally, to get to our econometric models, we use two di⁄erent approaches.
The key question addressed in this paper is whether accreditation or intention
to seek accreditation (designated in the study by the acronyms, ISOACC and
ISOINT, respectively) has an important e⁄ect on mine costs or e¢ ciencies. The
2Note that some of the variables in Z1;::;Zk have zero values (e.g. are dummy variables)
and are directly included in the cost function (i.e. are not logged).
8most direct way of addressing this question is to simply include dummy variables
measuring both ISO 14001 accreditation and the intention to seek ISO14001
accreditation in the regression. Given that we have panel data, this amounts to
adding the dummy variables as additional explanatory variables in our translog
function (4) in a random e⁄ects model. That is, we have:3













j=1 ￿j ln(Zj;it) + ￿1ISOINTit + ￿2ISOACCit
; (5)
The coe¢ cients on ISOINT and ISOACC can be examined to address
the question: ￿After controlling for mine characteristics, does accreditation (or
intention to seek accreditation) of the ISO 14001 standard have an e⁄ect on a
mine￿ s costs?￿
An alternative approach is to estimate each mine￿ s e¢ ciency using stochastic
frontier methods, and see whether mine e¢ ciency is associated with certi￿cation
or the intention to seek ISO certi￿cation. Accordingly, we adopt two di⁄erent
implementations of panel data stochastic frontier models (e.g. see [29]). The
￿rst of these is the standard stochastic frontier function based on:











j=1 ￿j ln(Zj;it) + vit + ui
; (6)
where vit re￿ ects measurement error and ui is ine¢ ciency Given the log
speci￿cation, e¢ ciency is time invariant:
￿i = exp(ui): (7)
The second is the time-varying e¢ ciency model of Battesi and Coelli [5],
which is the same as (6) except that ui becomes the time varying uit which
takes the form:
uit = expf￿￿ (t ￿ Ti)gui (8)
where Ti is the number of years available for mine i. With this speci￿cation,
e¢ ciency is:
￿it = exp(uit): (9)
Note that cost e¢ ciencies, when de￿ned in these ways, are greater than one,
with higher values indicating less e¢ ciency. We estimate both stochastic fron-
tier models using a maximum likelihood procedure which assumes measurement
error is Normally distributed and ine¢ ciency is truncated Normal. Once we
have obtained estimates of these e¢ ciencies we then use regression methods to
see if they are associated with ISO 14001 standard.
3To estimate this model, we use Stata￿ s maximum likelihood algorithm which assumes the
random e⁄ect is Normally distributed as is the regression error.
94 Data
Variable de￿nitions, sources and acronyms are described more fully below and
are also summarized in Appendix A. The study measures e¢ ciency and cost
savings in 99 copper mines from 1992 to 2007 and contains 1265 observations.
A subset of mines in the sample for which start-up costs were available has 641
observations for 52 mines.
The study conceptually de￿nes variables through their inclusion in the fol-
lowing groups.
Group 1: Total costs
Group 2: Output measure
Group 3: Price inputs
Group 4: Investments
Group 5: Physical/geological factors
Group 6: Regulatory variables
4.0.1 Dependent Variable
Group 1. The study￿ s dependent variable measures total costs (TOTAL) for
the mine of mining and milling Cu ore. This variable is measured in terms of
US millions of dollars per day. It includes all onsite milling and mining costs
involved in the extraction and processing of metal from ore using the inputs of
energy, capital and labour.
4.0.2 Independent Variables
Group 2. Output measure. The study￿ s output measure (METAL) is the
amount of Cu metal produced in kilotonnes per year.
Group 3. The study includes a number of price inputs. Two price inputs
measure energy costs: diesel and electricity. Diesel (DIESEL) costs are measured
in US c/liter per day. Electricity (ELECT) costs are measured in US c/kwh
per day. Other inputs include grinding media (the costs of metallic and other
materials for grinding ore) in US dollars per tonne per day. Reagents/acid price
inputs (REAGENT), another important price input relevant to the milling stage,
is measured in US cents/kg per day. The price of labour (WAGES) is measured
as the average hourly labor cost in US$ per hour per day. Another price input
(GRIND) applies to grinding media (the price of metallic balls for grinding and
crushing ore). It is measured in US $/tonne per day.
Group 4. The study￿ s investment variables measure capital investment. Cap-
ital investment is measured in two ways: a) Capital expenditure (CAPEX) and
b) setup costs (SETUP). CAPEX is measured in US millions of dollars per
year. Setup costs are also a potentially important variable a⁄ecting di⁄erences
in e¢ ciency across mines. SETUP measures capital costs of establishing the
mine, measured in millions US dollars per year. Although not ideal in that
data on set-up costs are available for only a subset of mines in the analysis,
other variables in the study (e.g. scale of mining (MILL), output (METAL)
and capital expenditures (CAPEX) will capture the impact of start-up costs on
e¢ ciency on the assumption that larger mines would handle more ore, produce
more output and have greater capital expenditures.
10Group 5. These factors relate to both geological and other characteristics of
the mine that a⁄ect how di¢ cult it is to access the ore and how much "work"
(i.e. equipment and manpower) it requires to mine and mill it. The ￿rst of these
variables (TYPE) controls for type of mine, i.e. open pit vs. underground. It
is measured as a dummy variable; 1 for underground and 0 for open pit. In
the few cases where mines have both open pit and underground operations,
the study assigns them the value of 1 for underground mines on the basis that
open pit mines are often precursors to underground mines. Another geological
characteristic that impacts on the costs of both mining and milling is grade of
ore (OREGRADE), measured as the percentage of Cu metal within the ore.
Lower grade ores, for instance, are harder to access and create more waste in
the processing of the ore.
Another variable (DRILLCOND) is an index measure of geological charac-
teristics summarizing drilling patterns and power usage. This index ranges from
0.6 (good) to 2.0 (poor) and applies to open pit mines only. Its underground
mine counterpart (GROUNDCOND) is an index that depends on rock compe-
tence and other conditions. This number ranges from 1 (good) to 5.0 (poor).
Since DRILLCOND and GROUNDCOND only apply for underground and open
pit mines, respectively, we interact them with underground/open pit dummies,
respectively. An ore work index (WORK) is also included; this variable is ap-
plicable to both types of mining practices. It measures the amount of power
required to crush and grind the ore and is measured in kwh/t. Speci￿cally, it
is the amount of power required to break ore from a theoretically in￿nite feed
size to 80% passing 100 m.
In addition to these physical/geological factors, the study controls for scale
of mining. Recent research suggests that size of an operation may in￿ uence to
a certain degree whether ￿rms will be likely to join voluntary programs as a
result of lower marginal abatement costs due to economies of scale and greater
number of personnel and exposure to liabilities [4, 42, 3, 2, 14].4 This scale
variable (MILL) is measured as the total ore treated in each mine in kilotonnes
per year. The study uses a milling measure rather than a mining measure of total
output since the former is an end product of the operations the study measures;
it represents the pure ore, treated after extraction, crushing and grinding, to
remove waste rock and other metals. Finally, another variable (DAYS) captures
durational di⁄erences in operation that may a⁄ect costs. DAYS controls for the
number of days per year the mine is in operation.
Group 6. Two independent variables measure the regulatory aspects of the
study. One regulatory variable (ISOINT) measures the intention of mines to seek
ISO 14001 certi￿cation. This dummy variable represents the period when the
mine makes changes in its management en-route to eventual certi￿cation. The
attainment of 14001 certi￿cation is measured as a dummy variable, ISOACC. As
part of the process of eventual certi￿cation all ￿rms have to publicly announce
their intention to seek ISO 14001 certi￿cation. Obtaining certi￿cation can take
several or more years; hence certi￿cation does not come immediately after the
expressed intention to seek certi￿cation. Certi￿cation must be obtained by
4There is also some evidence to suggest that polluting industries will be more likely to adopt
the ISO 14001 standard than cleaner or non-polluting industries (see e.g. [33]). Although
pollution data at the mine level were not available for this study, it is reasonable to assume
for the copper mining industry that the more ore that is milled the more enivronmental impact
the process will have.
11accredited external agencies who are also responsible for on-going monitoring
to ensure compliance.
All variables de￿nitions and acronyms are summarized in Table 1, Appendix
A. Data for the study came from a variety of sources. ISO data came from annual
company reports and direct inquiries with head o¢ ce. Other data came from
company annual reports, stock exchange ￿lings, and two industry proprietary
datasets [31, 38] measuring a range of geological, production and cost data for
the mining industry.
In this study output (METAL), price inputs (WAGES, POWER, GRIND,
REAGENT, DIESEL), and total cost (TOTALCOST) variables are given the
standard full translog treatment as discussed in the methodology section. The
study￿ s physical/geological and investment variables are entered as regular ex-
planatory variables in the model to control for these other mine heterogeneity
issues. (To give them a full translog treatment would result in a model with a
huge number of coe¢ cients to estimate). Treatment of the study￿ s regulatory
variables is carried out in two di⁄erent ways, as described in the methodology
section.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Results for the Cost Frontier
Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B present estimates and p-values for the coe¢ -
cients of the cost function for the study￿ s three di⁄erent modelling approaches
(i.e. a random e⁄ects model, the stochastic frontier model with time invari-
ant ine¢ ciency and the stochastic frontier model with time varying e¢ ciency).
The shape of the cost function does not reveal much about the research ques-
tion of interest. However, the following points are noteworthy about the results
presented in Table 2:
1. All three approaches yield the same rough shapes for the cost frontier.
Recall that the random e⁄ects speci￿cation uses ISOACC and ISOINT as ex-
planatory variables whereas the other approaches do not (i.e. in respect to the
latter two models the ISO variables are reserved for the second regression which
tries to explain e¢ ciency). Results for the random e⁄ects model (when we ex-
clude the ISO variables) are very similar to those produced by the stochastic
frontier model with time-invariant e¢ ciency (and thus, for the sake of brevity,
are not reported here).
2. There is strong evidence that the use of the translog functional form
is important since many of the squares and cross products of the explanatory
variables are signi￿cant.
3. The remaining coe¢ cients in the translog production function are pre-
sented in Table 3 in Appendix B. The coe¢ cient results for these investment,
physical/geological and regulatory variables are for the most part highly sig-
ni￿cant and of the expected sign. One possible exception is DAYS, which is
negative. This ￿nding could indicate unmeasured costs associated with the
maintenance or re-opening of a mine after temporary shut-down.
125.2 Results for Regulatory or ISO Variables
Most crucial for the research question of this paper is the impact of the ISO
variables on e¢ ciency and cost savings. Table 4 presents three di⁄erent models
used to examine this question for the full sample of mines. The motivation given
previously suggests that the ISO variables could have a bene￿cial e⁄ect on the
e¢ ciency with which a mine is operated by forcing a facility to think about and
implement resource savings and reduce pollution impacts on the environment
at every point in its operations.
The e¢ ciencies in our two di⁄erent stochastic frontier models are de￿ned in
equations (7) and (9). They are de￿ned such that small values indicate high
e¢ ciency and large values low e¢ ciency. If we simply run a regression of the
e¢ ciencies on an intercept and ISOINT and ISOACC we obtain the results in
Table 4.5 Table 4 also reproduces coe¢ cients for ISOINT and ISOACC from
the random e⁄ects regression model ￿rst presented in Table 3. Note that these
latter coe¢ cients measure the e⁄ects of ISO variables on costs (rather than on
e¢ ciency) so that the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are not comparable for the
random e⁄ects and the e¢ ciency analysis.
Most importantly, however, in respect to the variable coe¢ cients for ISOACC,
Table 4 indicates that they are negative for all models. These ￿ndings suggest
that ISO 14001 accreditation is associated with lower costs and more e¢ cient
mining operations. For the regressions using e¢ ciencies as explanatory vari-
ables, ISOACC is statistically signi￿cant. In the case of the random e⁄ects
model this variable is not signi￿cant. There is also evidence that intention to
seek 14001 accreditation is also associated with lower costs and more e¢ ciency;
however results are weaker than for the ISOACC variable (in the sense of be-
ing less statistically signi￿cant). That is, the point estimates of the coe¢ cient
on ISOINT in all three models are negative; but only for the model with time
varying e¢ ciency do we ￿nd the coe¢ cient to be signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Results in Table 5 are in exactly the same format as before, except that
they apply to the sample of data for which startup costs are available (641
observations available on 52 mines). This variable is included in the translog
cost function. For the sake of brevity, we do not present results from the full
cost function. The coe¢ cients of the translog cost frontier for all three models
were similar to those used for the cost function applied to the full sample of
mines (and are available on request). However, results relating to the ISO
variables show no signi￿cant e¢ ciency outcomes for either the intention to seek
ISO 14001 certi￿cation or for ISO 14001 accreditation for any model, although
many coe¢ cients have the same negative signs as in the full sample (and in the
case of using time-varying e¢ ciency, results are almost signi￿cant at the 10%
level).
Thus, econometricians may disagree about whether the coe¢ cients relating
to the ISO variables are either negative (indicating that the adoption of ISO
is actually good for mines) or zero (indicating no impact). However, no econo-
metrician could reasonably interpret the results to mean that adopting the ISO
14001 standard leads to higher costs or lower e¢ ciency, contrary to much of the
academic literature on regulation.
5Note that the ISO variables sometimes vary over time, so all cross-sectional and time
series observations are included in the regressions.
13****Tables 4 & 5 Here***
This inconsistency in signi￿cance for bene￿cial outcomes of the adoption
of the ISO 14001 standard across models and subsamples has been found in
other studies that have focused on the environmental performance of ￿rms (e.g.
Barla 2007). This inconsistency may relate to the diversity of reasons often
given by ￿rms for adopting the standard in the ￿rst place. An examination
of the individual mine e¢ ciency estimates for both stochastic frontier models
indicates strong variability in e¢ ciency across ￿rms. For instance, Table 5
provides estimates of the time varying e¢ ciencies for the top 10 performing
mines in 2007 (which are qualitatively the same as the time-invariant measures).
In this year, 50% had 1SO 14001 certi￿cation, with the top performing mine
also being ISO 14001 certi￿ed. Likewise, among the 10 least e¢ cient mines
in the sample, a nearly identical number (30%) had certi￿cation in 2007. As
with the most e¢ cient mine in the sample, the least e¢ cient mine was also ISO
14001 certi￿ed in 2007. However, these ￿ndings do not detract from the overall
conclusion of the paper that the adoption of the ISO 14001 standard will not
impact inversely on e¢ ciency and may have even lead to greater e¢ ciency.
***Table 6 Here***
6 Discussion and conclusion
The number of ￿rms adopting the ISO 14001 standard since its inception in
1996 has risen dramatically. However, beyond a small body of case study liter-
ature and anecdotal evidence there has been very little, particularly empirical,
research examining whether the ISO 14001 standard achieves such oft-cited ob-
jectives as improved environmental performance, e¢ ciency and cost savings,
increased stock performance, enhanced corporate image, regulatory relief, and
reduced legal liabilities. This study has contributed to the few empirical studies
that have analyzed the impact of ISO 14001 and 14001-like EMS systems on
plant or ￿rm performance. All of these studies have looked at their impact on
environmental performance, measured in terms of environmental e¢ ciency (e.g.
as a ratio between the costs of the loss of desirable output relative to the costs of
reducing undesirable outputs) or in terms of actual pollution levels (e.g. BOD
levels).
This study has diverged from this literature by focusing on non-environmental
outcomes, namely e¢ ciency and cost savings. These are important, oft-cited ob-
jectives of the ISO 14001 standard that are also worthy of measure. Case study
and anecdotal evidence suggests e¢ ciency and cost savings are important moti-
vations for seeking ISO 14001 certi￿cation. They are considered more important
than ￿and may even drive ￿environmental concerns [32].
This study has found that ISO 14001 certi￿cation was signi￿cantly associated
with higher e¢ ciency in all models. This signi￿cant association, however, did
not apply in a subset sample of mines for which start-up costs were measured
nor did it apply to cost savings although the latter was marginally signi￿cant
in the full sample. Findings for the intention to adopt ISO 14001 regulations
indicate stronger signi￿cance in terms of greater e¢ ciency for both stochastic
14frontier model speci￿cations, but not for the random e⁄ects model measuring
cost savings. As in the full sample, the signi￿cant fdinding for the intention to
adopt the ISO 14001 standard did not carry over to a subset sample of the data
for which startup costs were available. Although on the whole ￿ndings for both
variables were inconsistently signi￿cant and not robust across model choice or
sample, at the very least, they indicate that neither the intention to adopt the
ISO 14001 standard nor the achievement of ISO 14001 certi￿cation is associated
with greater cost and less e¢ ciency.
Two possible interpretations for the lack of consistent signi￿cance and ro-
bustness for the ISO 14001 measures examined in this study are as follows:
One interpretation may be derived from the case study and anecdotal litera-
ture. This literature has shown that ￿rms pursue ISO 14001 certi￿cation for a
variety of reasons, with e¢ ciency and cost savings being two among many, but
perhaps not the most important reasons. Or it may be that the importance of
these outcomes for ￿rms are linked to speci￿c internal or external circumstances,
which are not easy to identify in this kind of study. These circumstances may
make it more likely that if ￿rms were to adopt the ISO 14001 standard and
gain certi￿cation, they would achieve e¢ ciency and/or cost savings outcomes
not open to others. However, irrespective of their circumstances, CEOs in the
copper industry may ￿nd some comfort from the ￿nding that the adoption of
the ISO 14001 standard, at a minimum, will not lead to less e¢ ciency or higher
costs.
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